文 / MingSir
近年来，在中美关系日益紧张的背景下，关于“中国留学生是否被要求为中国政府提供情报”的议题屡屡成为外界关注的焦点。一些媒体甚至声称：“中国法律强制出国学生为中共收集情报。”这一说法到底是否属实？我们不妨从法律文本、现实案例与国际反应三个层面，作一次理性的澄清与分析。
一、争议源头：国家情报法第七条
2017年6月，中国全国人大通过《中华人民共和国国家情报法》。其中最常被引用的一条是：
第七条：任何组织和公民应当依法支持、协助和配合国家情报工作，保守所知悉的国家情报工作秘密。
在一些西方国家，尤其是美国的安全和情报分析中，这一条被理解为：中国公民在境外期间也可能被要求为国家从事情报服务，包括在高校、企业或实验室中获取技术或数据。
但值得强调的是：
- 法律文本并未明确界定“协助情报工作”的方式或范围；
- 也未提及“留学生”这一具体身份类别；
- 现实中是否要求协助，需要通过指令、行动或案例来确认，而不是仅凭法律可能性推断。
二、现实中确有争议案例，但并不代表普遍性
近年来确有若干中国科研人员或学生在美被指控涉嫌技术盗取或隐瞒与中国机构合作。著名案例包括：
- 陈霞芬案（Xiaoxing Xi）：美籍华人教授，曾被FBI错误逮捕，后被撤诉；
- 包丽案（Bo Mao）：德州大学访问学者，被控盗取Cisco技术资料，后被撤销控罪；
- 还有一些在美国接受国防项目资助但未申报中国合作经历的学者遭到调查。
然而，绝大多数中国留学生并不涉案，他们专注学业和研究，遵守所在国法律。
以偏概全，将个案行为泛化为“制度性任务”，是一种危害极大的偏见。
三、国际反应：警惕“安全关切”演化为“政治污名”
美国《国家情报战略》文件中曾指出，中国情报系统日益多元，可能通过“非传统人员”获取信息。这一论点促使FBI等机构加强了对中国背景人员的审查与管理。
同时，美国司法部曾一度推动“中国行动计划（China Initiative）”，试图从安全角度防范技术外流。但在2022年，该计划被正式取消，因其在执行中引发了对亚裔群体的系统性歧视指控，甚至被认为“制造了寒蝉效应”。
“我们不能把每一位中国人、每一个中国学生、每一位科研人员都假定为间谍。”
——美国大学协会（AAU）公开声明
四、中国官方立场：否认有组织指令、强调“合作开放”
中国外交部在回应类似指责时，多次强调：
- 中国没有法律要求留学生或海外公民充当间谍；
- 国家情报法的适用是“依法有界”，不涉境外普通公民；
- 美国等国家应停止对中国普通学生与学者的“污名化”。
五、我们需要什么样的态度？
在全球学术合作、人文交流日益频繁的今天，安全关切无可避免，但我们更需要的是：
- 对事实与法律的准确理解；
- 对个体行为的证据判断，而不是身份标签化；
- 对跨文化交流的理性尊重，而非冷战式推演。
对于中国留学生而言：
- 要增强法律意识，既尊重中国的基本法制，也要严格遵守所在国法律；
- 若遇境外机构或人员要求其提供敏感数据，应保持警惕，学会依法自我保护；
- 同时也有权拒绝任何来自任何方面的不当胁迫。
结语：
法律需要被准确解读，不能被恶意泛化；安全需要被严肃对待，也不能掩盖偏见本身。
在全球化遭遇裂解与误解日益加剧的当下，让我们坚持理性、坚持边界、坚持善意，也坚持追问事实。
China’s National Intelligence Law and the “Student Spy” Narrative: What the Law Says, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters
By MingSir
In recent years, one claim has repeatedly surfaced in public discourse—that Chinese students studying abroad are legally required to gather intelligence for the Chinese government. This assertion has generated fear, suspicion, and in some cases, discriminatory actions against Chinese nationals overseas. But is this claim legally accurate?
Let’s take a clear-eyed look at the law itself, the real-world implications, and the need for nuanced understanding in a polarized global environment.
1. The Law in Question: Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law
Passed in 2017, China’s National Intelligence Law (NIL) includes a clause that has been widely scrutinized:
Article 7: “All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with the law, and shall protect any national intelligence work secrets they become aware of.”
This article has been interpreted by some foreign governments—particularly the U.S.—as meaning that all Chinese citizens, including students and researchers abroad, are legally obligated to serve as intelligence assets when called upon.
However, this interpretation goes beyond the letter of the law:
- The law does not specifically mention students;
- It does not define what “assistance” entails or how it applies extraterritorially;
- There is no public evidence of blanket, systemic recruitment of overseas students for intelligence work under this article.
2. Real Cases Exist, But They Don’t Prove a General Rule
There have been a handful of high-profile cases involving Chinese researchers or students accused of technology theft or visa fraud in the U.S.—some ended in conviction, others in dropped charges due to lack of evidence.
Yet, painting all Chinese international students as potential spies is as dangerous as it is inaccurate. Tens of thousands of Chinese students pursue legitimate academic work abroad and have no contact with any intelligence agency.
3. The Dangers of Overgeneralization: From National Security to Political Stigmatization
The U.S. “China Initiative,” launched in 2018 and officially shut down in 2022, was initially aimed at combating economic espionage. But it ended up disproportionately targeting ethnic Chinese scientists, causing fear, injustice, and an exodus of talent.
Academic institutions like MIT and Stanford publicly opposed this trend, with university leaders warning that national security cannot justify racial profiling or academic suppression.
4. China’s Official Response: Denial and Emphasis on Lawful Cooperation
The Chinese government has stated repeatedly that:
- The Intelligence Law does not target students or overseas citizens;
- Intelligence activities are conducted within legal boundaries;
- Foreign governments should stop using legal pretexts to smear Chinese citizens.
While these statements are politically motivated, they underscore the complexity of interpreting national laws in a global context.
5. What Should Be Done?
- For governments: Guard against real threats, yes—but do so based on facts, not ethnicity or citizenship.
- For academic institutions: Promote openness and equal treatment while safeguarding sensitive research.
- For Chinese students: Be aware of both home and host country laws. You have the right to refuse any illegal demands—from either side.
Conclusion
Security concerns are real. But so are fairness, facts, and global understanding. Blanket suspicion based on nationality not only undermines individual rights—it also threatens the very values that democratic societies claim to uphold.
Let us respond to fear with clarity, to speculation with law, and to division with dialogue.
请填写您的邮箱，免费订阅作者最新文章。
发表回复